| EncuestaInicial |
Chen, D.L., Schonger, M., Wickens, C., 2016. oTree - An open-source platform for laboratory, online and field experiments. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, vol 9: 88-97.
Stanford IRB Protocol 68188: Populism and the Failure of Anti-Corruption Reforms in Post-Democratized Latin America. Approved 03-23-2023, no expiration, Expedited category 7, minimal risk.
|
| JuegoDictador (3 rounds) |
Un jugador decide asignar un monto entre el(ella) misma y otro(a) jugador(a). Véase: Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler. "Fairness and the assumptions of economics." Journal of business (1986):
S285-S300.
|
| Bribery_Indifference |
This is a repeated "Bribery game". A citizen and an officer are asked separately whether they want to offer a bribe, and if the bribe is offered, whether they accept it. The choices directly determine the
payoffs, which depend on the probability of a third party enforcer being able to punish both the corrupt official and the citizen.
|